iie [they/them, he/him]

I go by “test” on live.hexbear.net, or “tset” or “tst” or some other variant when I’m not logged in.

We watch movies on the weekends and sometimes also hang out during the week, you should drop by.

  • 74 Posts
  • 371 Comments
Joined 5 years ago
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Cake day: July 30th, 2020

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  • When I say “consciousness,” I mean your subjective experience of being alive and not dead, the difference between a cascade of nerve signals and the experience of biting into an apple. How that arises, no one really knows for sure, which is why it’s called “the hard problem of consciousness.”

    “The self” and “consciousness” are two different things. “The self” might be illusory—or at least, we might put that label on the wrong thing, and then realize it when we detach from that thing during mindfulness meditation, which can be a profound experience—but consciousness is deeper than that. A tardigrade probably has no sense of self, but it almost certainly has some experience of being alive.

    In sci-fi, often you can save a copy of your mind, which can then be loaded into a new body if you die. This is usually conflated with immortality. The question is, would your subjective experience continue in that new body, or would it be a clone with your memories? This is not a semantic question, our definition of self does not factor into this. Subjective experience either continues or it doesn’t.

    A common argument goes like this: the machine that loads your backup into a new body could easily load it into two bodies simultaneously. Which body would your subjective experience resume in? My brain lobes argument counters this by pointing out that consciousness can split: one thread of subjective experience can split into two. So, if your consciousness can resume in one backup, then in theory it could resume in two or more backups at once. This refocuses the question on the importance of interruptions, rather than multiplicity. Can your thread of subjective experience resume after a total interruption? I don’t know. In my original comment, I consider both possibilities.


  • Don’t even need to separate the lobes, let alone create separate bodies for this.

    What do you mean by this?

    If you don’t separate the lobes, then you still have a single connected network of neurons, which probably forms a single mass of experience. It’s cool and interesting if you want to question that, I can see some possible lines of argument, but none are obvious enough that you can just gesture at them and people know what you mean.

    Meh, in real life it’s experimentally and experientially identical to consciousness surviving an interruption.

    Experimentally yes, but not experientially. You either experience the next instant or you don’t.

    We’ll probably never know, so there’s no reason to worry about it—although that won’t always stop someone in a bad headspace, hence the spoiler—but if you like thinking about how consciousness works, then the idea inevitably comes up and needs to be acknowledged.

    circle jerking.

    Unfalsifiable does not mean stupid to think about.

    For starters, it’s intrinsically worthwhile to map out the space of possibilities, even if you might never be able to narrow things down within that space. But also, it’s a necessary step if you want to really convince yourself that it is unfalsifiable. You have to actually consider the relevant thought experiments and their ramifications.

    This is just like solipsism circle jerking.

    Unlike solipsism, continuity of consciousness is a question you can actually reason about. You can study the brain, the neurons, the synapses, to see if any physical process looks continuous for the whole brain over time and space. Roger Penrose, for quantum mechanical reasons, thinks experiential consciousness resides in the microtubules, which are cytoskeletal filaments inside the cells of the brain. Others argue pretty strongly that there is nothing special about microtubules. But there’s an actual discussion! Even if it turns out to be unfalsifiable, the discussion itself will have been fruitful because it helped us determine that.

    use diamat — @iridaniotter@hexbear.net

    Agreed with the use diamat. Everything is constantly changing, constantly dying. Hypothetical idealist arguments are silly, it’s understood by quantum physics. — @QueerCommie@hexbear.net

    Materialism tells you why things happen, it tells you where thoughts come from, why the brain does what it does, which is great, but continuity of consciousness is a more elusive question, because it has no effect on a person’s brain activity or behavior. A perfect clone with the same memories is indistinguishable from the original, unless you actually track the whereabouts of the original and the clone to prove which one zapped into existence 30 minutes ago.

    Maybe you feel that’s worthless to think about, but we’re already in a thread where OP is thinking about it.

    OP imagines their subjective experience continuing after a prolonged interruption of existence. Dialectical materialism and quantum physics do not readily tell you if that can happen.


  • possibly disturbing existentialism

    when that distant mind forms, eons from now, will you experience it? or will it be a clone with your memories?

    what if two identical minds form at the same time, both of which have your memories and thoughts? Which set of eyes will you look out of?

    continuity of consciousness is a strange thing

    in fact, the “two identical minds” example proves nothing, you could be both of them. A consciousness can be split: for example, if you separate the lobes of a person’s brain, put each lobe in a new body, then regrow the missing lobes, you get two people who each can claim they are the original. That person’s life seamlessly branched into two lives without interruption.

    and what about interruption? does it matter? if you delete a person’s atoms for a nanosecond, then restore them, do you have the original or a clone? I doubt we’ll ever know. If consciousness can survive a total interruption, if the same life resumes afterward, then I start to wonder if we are all packets of a single consciousness. On the other hand, if consciousness can’t survive an interruption, then I start to wonder if we are constantly dying from one instant to the next, a series of clones like frames of a film.


  • when I buy groceries, sometimes I look around and realize what a weird moment in human history consumer capitalism is. Suddenly I’m peering out of the pages of a history book at some kid in the future, in their room wondering what consumer capitalism was like, what it felt like, amazed that the past was once the present and those were all real people. Now I’m standing there in the grocery store having some kind of Koyaanisqatsi-like out-of-body experience in the cereal isle, because I’m that real person in the past.



  • A culture of deescalation and patient communication among ordinary users would also help us.

    The more people fight, the more that bitterness builds up, which puts people on guard and leads to even more fights, and it becomes a feedback loop. Eventually people clique up to defend themselves, and communication breaks down even further, until the site dies.

    It’s hard, because deescalation requires some vulnerability, it’s like lowering your hands during a boxing match. People get vicious to protect themselves. They’re not inherently vicious, any more than two spouses who argue are bad people. The fight just gains a life of its own.

    It’s also slow. The longer you pause to gather your thoughts, process your emotions, and write a thoughtful response, the longer their comment goes unopposed, and the longer your peers are reading that hurtful stuff about you and maybe making up their minds.

    When you refuse to deescalate, though, that hostility ripples out into the community, it poisons the whole atmosphere. Struggle sessions are what drive people off the site more than anything else, just the sheer misery of them. It drives away people who are more conflict averse and less terminally online, leaving only the people who are too invested to leave—the same people who have the hardest time deescalating.

    I really think somehow we need to shift our culture, but I don’t know how.

    *I keep tweaking the wording of this comment like I’m chewing my nails. I’m going to bed.