on a related note, dropping this rare banger line from wikipedia:
Some philosophers of mind, like Daniel Dennett, argue that qualia do not exist. Other philosophers, as well as neuroscientists and neurologists, believe qualia exist and that the desire by some philosophers to disregard qualia is based on an erroneous interpretation of what constitutes science.[2]
citation text from the wiki page for reference
Damasio, Antonio R. (2000). The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness. A Harvest book. San Diego, CA: Harcourt. ISBN 978-0-15-601075-7.
Edelman, Gerald M.; Gally, Joseph A.; Baars, Bernard J. (2011). “Biology of Consciousness”. Frontiers in Psychology. 2 (4): 4. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00004. ISSN 1664-1078. PMC 3111444. PMID 21713129.
Edelman, Gerald Maurice (1992). Bright air, brilliant fire: on the matter of the mind. New York: BasicBooks. ISBN 978-0-465-00764-6.
Edelman, Gerald M. (2003). “Naturalizing Consciousness: A Theoretical Framework”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 100 (9): 5520–5524. doi:10.1111/j.1600-0536.1978.tb04573.x. ISSN 0027-8424. JSTOR 3139744. PMID 154377. S2CID 10086119. Retrieved 2023-07-19.
Koch, Christof (2020). The feeling of life itself: why consciousness is widespread but can’t be computed (First MIT Press paperback edition 2020 ed.). Cambridge, MA London: The MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-53955-5.
Llinás, Rodolfo Riascos; Llinás, Rodolfo R. (2002). I of the vortex: from neurons to self. A Bradford book (1 ed.). Cambridge, Mass. London: MIT Press. pp. 202–207. ISBN 978-0-262-62163-2.
Oizumi, Masafumi; Albantakis, Larissa; Tononi, Giulio (2014-05-08). Sporns, Olaf (ed.). “From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0”. PLOS Computational Biology. 10 (5): e1003588. Bibcode:2014PLSCB…10E3588O. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588. ISSN 1553-7358. PMC 4014402. PMID 24811198.
Overgaard, M.; Mogensen, J.; Kirkeby-Hinrup, A., eds. (2021). Beyond neural correlates of consciousness. Routledge Taylor & Francis.
Ramachandran, V.; Hirstein, W. (March 1997). “What Does Implicit Cognition Tell Us About Consciousness?”. Consciousness and Cognition. 6 (1): 148. doi:10.1006/ccog.1997.0296. ISSN 1053-8100. S2CID 54335111.
Tononi, Giulio; Boly, Melanie; Massimini, Marcello; Koch, Christof (July 2016). “Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate”. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience. 17 (7): 450–461. doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44. ISSN 1471-0048. PMID 27225071. S2CID 21347087.
This is a bad summary of Dennett’s view, or at least a misleading one. He thinks that ‘qualia’ as most philosophers of mind define the term doesn’t refer to anything, and is just a weasel word obscuring that we really don’t have much of an understanding of how brains do the things they do. Qualia get glossed as the “what-it’s-like-ness” of experiences (e.g. the particular feeling of seeing the color blue), which isn’t wrong, but is only part of the story. ‘Qualia’ is a technical term in the philosophy of mind literature, and has a lot of properties attached to it (privacy, incorrigibility, ineffability, so on). Dennett argues that qualia in that sense–the philosopher’s qualia–is incoherent and internally inconsistent for a variety of reasons. This sometimes gets misrepresented as “Dennett thinks consciousness is an illusion” (a misreading that he, to be fair, could work harder to discourage), but that’s not the view. His argument against the philosopher’s qualia is pretty compelling, and doesn’t imply that people aren’t conscious. See “Quining Qualia” for a pretty accessible articulation of the argument.
deleted by creator
on a related note, dropping this rare banger line from wikipedia:
citation text from the wiki page for reference
Damasio, Antonio R. (2000). The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness. A Harvest book. San Diego, CA: Harcourt. ISBN 978-0-15-601075-7. Edelman, Gerald M.; Gally, Joseph A.; Baars, Bernard J. (2011). “Biology of Consciousness”. Frontiers in Psychology. 2 (4): 4. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00004. ISSN 1664-1078. PMC 3111444. PMID 21713129. Edelman, Gerald Maurice (1992). Bright air, brilliant fire: on the matter of the mind. New York: BasicBooks. ISBN 978-0-465-00764-6. Edelman, Gerald M. (2003). “Naturalizing Consciousness: A Theoretical Framework”. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 100 (9): 5520–5524. doi:10.1111/j.1600-0536.1978.tb04573.x. ISSN 0027-8424. JSTOR 3139744. PMID 154377. S2CID 10086119. Retrieved 2023-07-19. Koch, Christof (2020). The feeling of life itself: why consciousness is widespread but can’t be computed (First MIT Press paperback edition 2020 ed.). Cambridge, MA London: The MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-53955-5. Llinás, Rodolfo Riascos; Llinás, Rodolfo R. (2002). I of the vortex: from neurons to self. A Bradford book (1 ed.). Cambridge, Mass. London: MIT Press. pp. 202–207. ISBN 978-0-262-62163-2. Oizumi, Masafumi; Albantakis, Larissa; Tononi, Giulio (2014-05-08). Sporns, Olaf (ed.). “From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0”. PLOS Computational Biology. 10 (5): e1003588. Bibcode:2014PLSCB…10E3588O. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588. ISSN 1553-7358. PMC 4014402. PMID 24811198. Overgaard, M.; Mogensen, J.; Kirkeby-Hinrup, A., eds. (2021). Beyond neural correlates of consciousness. Routledge Taylor & Francis. Ramachandran, V.; Hirstein, W. (March 1997). “What Does Implicit Cognition Tell Us About Consciousness?”. Consciousness and Cognition. 6 (1): 148. doi:10.1006/ccog.1997.0296. ISSN 1053-8100. S2CID 54335111. Tononi, Giulio; Boly, Melanie; Massimini, Marcello; Koch, Christof (July 2016). “Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate”. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience. 17 (7): 450–461. doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44. ISSN 1471-0048. PMID 27225071. S2CID 21347087.
This is a bad summary of Dennett’s view, or at least a misleading one. He thinks that ‘qualia’ as most philosophers of mind define the term doesn’t refer to anything, and is just a weasel word obscuring that we really don’t have much of an understanding of how brains do the things they do. Qualia get glossed as the “what-it’s-like-ness” of experiences (e.g. the particular feeling of seeing the color blue), which isn’t wrong, but is only part of the story. ‘Qualia’ is a technical term in the philosophy of mind literature, and has a lot of properties attached to it (privacy, incorrigibility, ineffability, so on). Dennett argues that qualia in that sense–the philosopher’s qualia–is incoherent and internally inconsistent for a variety of reasons. This sometimes gets misrepresented as “Dennett thinks consciousness is an illusion” (a misreading that he, to be fair, could work harder to discourage), but that’s not the view. His argument against the philosopher’s qualia is pretty compelling, and doesn’t imply that people aren’t conscious. See “Quining Qualia” for a pretty accessible articulation of the argument.